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INTRODUCTION
Should a criminal be able to evade prosecution for money
laundering simply by channeling illegal funds through an account that
contains “clean” money in addition to the “dirty” proceeds of crime?
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently tackled this matter for
the first time in United States v. Haddad.1 In Haddad, a grocery store
owner convicted of food stamp fraud was found to have channeled
both the profit of fraud and his legitimate profit through the business’
operating account.2 The court was required to determine whether the
commingling of the funds could foil the evidentiary requirements of a
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1957, a money laundering statute
whose key element is that the transaction involves “knowingly
engaging in or attempting to engage in a monetary transaction in
criminally derived property that is valued greater than $10,000.”3
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2006).
2
Id. at 791.
3
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2006).
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Noting that the issue was one of first impression, and that it had
engendered a circuit split amongst the other courts to have addressed
it, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the commingling of funds would
not foil prosecution.4 While the Seventh Circuit achieved the correct
result in Haddad, they missed an opportunity to reconcile the
decisions of the other circuits and articulate a test that fits precedent,
the tests of other circuit courts, and the legislative goals incorporated
in § 1957 and its companion statute 18 U.S.C. § 1956.5 By failing to
articulate a test that correctly incorporates legislative intent and
precedent, the Seventh Circuit did nothing to clarify § 1957 law.6
Part I of this Comment will provide a brief look at the history of
money laundering law in the United States, including discussion of the
legislative history of both 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and § 1957 and an
examination of the primary cases which deal with money laundering
and which serve as background for the decisions of the Seventh
Circuit. Part II will detail the circumstances in US v. Haddad, and
examine how the court came to their decision. Part III will analyze the
Seventh Circuit’s decision and critique its rationale. Part IV will
discuss the potential effects of the Seventh Circuit’s holding and
discuss how the court missed an opportunity to clarify and distinguish
the issue of commingled funds in the context of § 1957 prosecutions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Money Laundering Law
Fundamentally, money laundering is “the process by which one
conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income,
and disguises that income to make it appear legitimate.”7 The ability to
4

Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792.
Id.
6
Id.
7
See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED
CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (1984).
5
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conceal the origin and nature of funds and to turn those funds into
“clean” money is an essential part of any large scale criminal
endeavor.8 Prior to passage of federal money laundering statutes, the
federal government relied on a combination of Title 21 conspiracy
provisions, Title 31 currency transaction reporting, and Title 18
conspiracy statutes to prosecute money laundering activities.9 In the
mid 1980’s, the huge profits generated by drug cartels and the
proliferation of schemes to circumvent currency reporting laws
inspired President Reagan to form a commission to investigate money
laundering.10 It soon became clear that financial institutions were
turning a blind eye towards transactions which were clearly designed
to circumvent established reporting requirements.11 In response to the
commission’s findings, Congress passed the Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986 (the “Act”), which was codified in 18 U.S.C. §§
1956, 1957.12

8

See Chirstopher Boran, Money Laundering, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 847, 848
(2003).
9
G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of the ‘90’s, 27 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 149, 150 (1989); see, e.g., Untied States v. Ospina, 798 F.2d 1570, 1578
(11th Cir 1986) (combination of Title 18 and Title 31 statutes).
10
See Executive Order 12,435 on July, 28 1983; see also Strafer, supra note 9,
at 150 (“The money laundering legislation developed from three otherwise disparate
doctrinal threads (a) an evolving law of conspiracy; (b) forfeiture law; and (c) law
enforcement authorities' perceived difficulties with enforcement of the currency
transaction reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act”).
11
See Tax Evasion, Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering as they Involve
Financial Institutions: Hearings on H.R 1367, H.R. 1474, H.R.1945, H.R. 2785, H.R.
3892, H.R. 4280 and H.R. 4573 Before the Subcom. On Financial Institutions
Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the H. Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, 99TH CONG. 79-109 (1986) (statement of Mr. Friedburg, former
money launderer, who testified that he would often convert as much as $100,000 in
cash per day into cashier's checks at south Florida banks in increments of $9,000,
below the $10,000 reporting threshold, a practice known as “smurfing”); see also
Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the Federal Criminal Law: The
Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41 FLA. L. REV. 287 (1989) (Generally, federal
“anti-smurfing” law and structuring crimes).
12
See Strafer, supra note 9, at 161.
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Section 1956 criminalizes financial transactions that are intended
to hide the proceeds of crimes ranging from securities fraud to
espionage to smuggling and drug trafficking.13 Section 1956 defines
two categories of offense, “transaction” offenses, and “transportation”
offenses.14 To commit a “transaction” offense, one must:
1) “conduct” or “attempt” to conduct;
2) a “financial transaction”;
3) “involv[ing]” property which represents the
“proceeds of specified unlawful activity”;
4) “knowing” that the property constitutes “proceeds”
of “some” unlawful activity.15
Section 1956 (a)(1)(A) goes on to require intent to either promote
“the carrying on of specified unlawful activities” or to violate certain
tax codes.16 Section 1956 (a)(1)(B) requires knowledge either that the
transaction is intended to “conceal or disguise the nature, the location,
the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified
unlawful activity” or knowledge that the transaction is meant to “avoid
a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law.”17
Section 1956 (a)(2) targets the transportation of funds involved in
criminal activity.18 This section defines transportation as
“transportation, transmi[ssion] and transfer” of “a monetary instrument
or funds” from place to place in the United States, or to or from the
United States to a “place outside the United States.”19 A third section,
§ 1956 (a)(3), serves to criminalize transfers in property “represented

13

18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1), (a)(1)(D)(2006).
Id. at § 1956 (a).
15
Id. at § 1956 (a)(1); see also Strafer, supra note 9, at 161.
16
18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1)(A)
17
Id.
18
Id. at § 1956 (a)(2)
19
Id.
14
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to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,” providing criminal
penalties for those caught in government “sting” operations.20
Section 1956 does not have any minimum value requirement.21
This makes sense in the context of the legislative origins of the law as
a tool to deal with structuring crimes meant to evade the requirements
of the bank secrecy act, with its currency reporting requirements.22 It
also sheds light on the congressional intent of 18 U.S.C § 1957, which
has as its central tenet neither a laundry list of predicate offenses nor
intent to further the criminal activity, but a minimum value limit of
$10,000 in criminally derived property.23
Section 1957 targets anyone who “knowingly engages or attempts
to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a
value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful
activity.”24 As such, it is potentially much broader than § 1956, which
requires that the money come from a specified illegal activity and be
concealed in an attempt to further that activity.25 Importantly, unlike §
1956, it is not necessary for the accused to actually launder the funds,
or posses any specific intent to “promote the carrying on of specified
unlawful activity.”26 Section 1957 applies to any and every transaction
totaling $10,000 in illegally generated funds, enabling it to affect

20

Id. at § 1956 (a)(3); see also Max Kaufman et al., Money Laundering, 34
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 793, 797 (1997) (“it is illegal to conduct a financial transaction
involving property represented by a law enforcement officer to be the proceeds of a
specified unlawful activity” as long as the other intent factors are present).
21
See 18 U.S.C. § 1956.
22
See generally 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (2006); see also The Money Laundering
Crimes Act of 1986, S. REP. NO. 433, 99TH CONG.
23
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (a), with 18 U.S.C. § 1956.
24
18 U.S.C. § 1957.
25
See 18 U.S.C. § 1956; see also Kaufman et al., supra note 20, at 798 (It is
suggested § 1957 is broad enough to criminalize seemingly “innocent” acts or
commercial transactions); see also Strafer, supra note 9, at 160 (“section 1957
potentially is a much broader section”).
26
18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1)(A)(i).
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almost any transaction.27 Indeed, many scholars have noted that this
section is “broad enough to criminalize seemingly ‘innocent’ acts or
commercial transactions.”28 This however, was arguably Congress’
intent.29 Most scholars stress that the law requires only that the
violator in a § 1957 case knowingly engage in the transaction
involving criminally derived property.30
B. Cases Dealing with Money Laundering
Despite federal money laundering laws being more than two
decades old, there is a virtual absence of Supreme Court case law.
Only Whitfield v. U.S., which held in part that a money laundering
conviction does not require an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy deals with money laundering law in a substantial way.31
Other Supreme Court cases have obliquely dealt with money
laundering through questions of venue, or in questions of sentencing
or forfeiture. 32 The Supreme Court has never decided a case which
involved a question of commingled funds in either a § 1956 or § 1957
prosecution.
While the Supreme Court has hardly dealt with money laundering
laws, and has not touched the subject of commingled funds, the lower
courts have tackled the issue on several occasions.33 Generally, the
27

See United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996) (“statute
applies to the most open, above-board transaction”).
28
Kaufman et al., supra note 20, at 798; see also Strafer, supra note 9, at 161.
29
See Boran, supra note 8, at 853 (quoting Representative Lundgren: “It is
time for us to tell the local trafficker and everyone else, '[i]f you know that person is
a trafficker and has this income derived from the offense, you better beware of
dealing with that person'” H.R. REP. NO. 99-855, pt. 1, at 14 (1986)).
30
See Boran, supra note 8, at 853.
31
Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005).
32
See, e.g., United States v. Cabrales, 534 U.S. 1 (1998) (venue question);
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (dealing with sentencing questions); United
States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (forfeiture question).
33
See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 227 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Ward, 197 F.3d 1076 (11th

610
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/7

6

Snedigar: Loose Change: The Seventh Circuit Misses an Opportunity to Clarif

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 2

Spring 2007

money laundering statutes have been attacked with little success on a
variety of grounds.34 Some rejected challenges have been grounded in
the theory that the law is too vague to be constitutionally viable.35 In
dealing with challenges raised under a theory that prosecution for both
the predicate offense and money laundering amounts to double
jeopardy, courts have generally found that money laundering and the
unlawful activity which generated the illicit funds are separate
offenses, separately punishable.36 Money laundering laws have also
been challenged unsuccessfully on grounds that some individual
money laundering crimes do not substantially affect interstate
commerce, placing them outside the regulation of Congress.37
The issue of commingling of funds has been addressed by the
various circuit courts in several cases.38 The majority of these cases,
however, deal with prosecutions under § 1956, which lacks § 1957’s
language requiring that the transaction involve “criminally derived
property of a value greater than $10,000.”39 In fact, dissecting the
language of many of the § 1956 cases dealing with commingling of
Cir. 1999; United States v. Cancelliere, 69 F.3d 1116 (11th Cir. 1995);); United
States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969
(4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d
1250 (8th Cir. 1990).
34
Boran, supra note 8 at 865 (“Three theories that have been used to attack the
Money Laundering Act with virtually no success are constitutional vagueness,
double jeopardy, and impermissibility of the Congressional act”).
35
Id.; see also United States v. Awan, 966 F.2d 1415, 1424 (11th Cir. 1992)
(holding that “some form of illegal activity is adequately defined”).
36
Boran, supra note 8 at 865-66; see also United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d
1206, 1213 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538, 1546 (9th Cir.
1996) (conviction for money laundering and underlying offense is not double
jeopardy).
37
Boran, supra note 8, at 866; see also United States v. Owens, 159 F.3d 221
(6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the use of federally insured banks or the transportation
of money across state lines creates sufficient nexus with interstate commerce).
38
See, e.g., Baker, 227 F.3d 955; Davis, 226 F.3d 346; Ward, 197 F.3d 1076;
Cancelliere, 69 F.3d 1116; Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359; Moore, 27 F.3d 969; Johnson, 971
F.2d 562; Jackson, 935 F.2d 832.
39
18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (emphasis added).
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funds, the lack of a floor value is one of the key factors in determining
that the combined funds can form the basis for prosecution.40 Rather, §
1956 (c)(1) specifies that “the term ‘knowing that the property
involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some
form of unlawful activity’ means that the person knew the property
involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form . . .
of activity that constitutes a felony under State, Federal, or foreign
law.”41 In United States v. Jackson, for example, Judge Flaum of the
Seventh Circuit said, “[w]e do not read Congress’s use of the word
‘involve’ as imposing the requirement that the government trace the
origin of all funds deposited into a bank account to determine exactly
which funds were used for what transaction.”42 This language is
repeated and agreed with by the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Garcia.43 The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Tencer again reiterated
the courts’ holdings that § 1956 prosecutions can be upheld by the
involvement of funds, without the need to trace all funds to a specified
transaction.44
The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of commingling funds
in United States v. Baker, a case which was mentioned in the Haddad
decision.45 In this case, Baker, who ran an illegal prostitution
operation as part of a business that also consisted of a legal sex shop
and strip club, appealed money laundering charges under § 1956.46
Baker alleges that the government must separate out the income from
40

See Baker, 227 F.3d at 965-66; United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 576
(7th Cir. 2000).
41
18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(1) (emphasis added).
42
Jackson, 935 F.2d at 840.
43
Garcia, 37 F.3d at 1365.
44
United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1131 (5th Cir. 1997).
45
See generally Baker, 227 F.3d 955. Baker, convicted of money laundering
and conspiracy relating to a prostitution ring run in conjunction with a legitimate
adult book and video store, striptease bar, and x-rated video arcade, alleged that the
government had to take into account the fact that some of the proceeds were “clean.”
The court found that the “clean” and “unclean” funds, once commingled, became
forfeitable.
46
Id. at 959.
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his legitimate business from that which he gleaned from sexual
services for the purpose of prosecution under the money laundering
laws.47 Again citing cases such as Jackson, and Tencer, Judge Flaum
found that there was no need for the government to trace the proceeds
to the individual transactions.48 The Seventh Circuit, relying on the
language of the Tencer and Jackson decisions, correctly held that it is
not necessary to separate “bona fide” income from illegal income
because all income is “involved in” the conspiracy that facilitated the
crime as a whole.49 It is important to note, however, that all of the
cases cited in the court’s decision are cases which deal specifically
with § 1956 violations, violations which have no minimum value
requirement.50 Baker is notable too for the fact that while Baker was
charged with six counts of violating § 1957, that particular statute was
not mentioned after the initial recitation of the charges lodged against
Baker.51
While there is a fairly substantial body of case law dealing with
the commingling of funds in § 1956 cases that generally indicates that
commingling will not defeat prosecution, there are only a few cases
that specifically address commingling of funds in § 1957
prosecutions.52 These include United States v. Moore, United States v.
Davis and United States v. Rutgard.53 These three cases dealing
specifically with commingled funds in § 1957 prosecutions are the
three main cases that the Seventh Circuit used to decide Haddad.54
In both Moore and Davis, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits
respectively determined that commingled funds can be treated as
47

Id. at 965.
Id. at 965-66.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
See generally id.
52
See, e.g., id. at 965; United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d at 1120, 1131 (5th Cir.
1997); United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 1991); see also United
States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d
346 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969 (4th Cir. 1994).
53
Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270; Davis, 226 F.3d 346; Moore, 27 F.3d 969.
54
United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783, 792 (7th Cir. 2006)
48

613
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

9

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 2

Spring 2007

illegitimate for the purposes of a § 1957 prosecution.55 In Moore, the
Fourth Circuit was faced with a transaction that involved the sale of
commercial condominiums that were purchased primarily with money
from fraudulently acquired loans.56 After selling the condominiums,
Moore deposited the proceeds of the sale, some $37,000, in a federally
insured bank, giving rise to the § 1957 charge.57 The court found that,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,
the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the $37,000 was
criminally derived property.58 One important aspect of this decision is
that the commingling of funds occurred when fraudulent funds were
mixed with a small amount of legitimate money in a real estate
investment.59 While the court noted that “money is fungible” a
condominium complex is certainly not, and “the illicitly-acquired
funds and the legitimately-acquired funds (or the respective portions
of the property purchased with each) cannot be distinguished from
each other.”60
The court in Moore relied on a variety of sources to determine
that commingling cannot defeat prosecution.61 First, they cited cases
such as Johnson and Jackson, which deal with commingling of funds
in § 1956 cases.62 The court also discussed the use of arbitrary
accounting methods as one way of determining the value, though the
case they cited, United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, dealt with
an entirely different forfeiture law.63 Through this lens, the court
55

See Moore, 27 F.3d at 976-77; Davis, 226 F.3d at 355-56.
Moore, 27 F.3d at 971-72.
57
Id. at 975.
58
Id. at 977.
59
Id. at 976-77.
60
Id.
61
See id.
62
Id. at 976
63
See id. at 977; see also United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d
1154, 1159-60 (2nd Cir. 1986) (dealing with forfeiture of drug profits contained in a
“commingled” account. The Court determines that, given the burden of proof
required in the circumstances presented, the government has a right to use what
amounts to either an “illegal-funds in, last out” or “illegal-funds in, first out”
56
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determined that “the transacted funds, at least up to the full amount
derived from crime, were the proceeds of the criminal activity or
derived from that activity.”64 Importantly, none of the precedent relied
upon dealt with crimes prosecuted under § 1957.65 Jackson, Johnson,
and United States v. Blackmun all dealt with prosecutions under §
1956, while United States v. Heath dealt with other bank fraud
statutes.66
In United States v. Davis the funds in question were derived from
an advance-fee scheme in which Davis took money from clients to
procure funding through his supposed access to valuable financial
instruments.67 Davis first argued unsuccessfully that the criminal
transactions were not completed by the time that the transactions
charged were undertaken, meaning that they could not have been
“criminally derived.”68 Davis then alleged that there was insufficient
evidence that he withdrew more than the $10,000 value limit required
by § 1957 from the account where he had both legitimate and
fraudulently obtained funds.69 The Fifth Circuit court, following their
own rule in Heath, found that the important factor was whether the
aggregate withdrawals exceeded the amount of “clean funds”
available.70 The court found that “the government proved aggregate
accounting method, at their discretion to overcome the lenient “probable cause for a
forfeiture” standard established by Congress).
64
Moore, 27 F.3d at 977.
65
See id.
66
See United States v. Heath, 970 F.2d 1397, 1403-04 (5th Cir. 1992) (In a
bank fraud case, aggregate total of withdrawals in question far exceeds the value of
legitimate funds available), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1004 (1993); United States v.
Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 570 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d
832, 840 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Blackmun, 904 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir.
1990) (section 1956 conviction of drug dealer for four wire transfers with an
aggregate value of $11,000, need not trace funds to a particular criminal activity,
finding that evidence of criminal activity and a lack of legitimate income is
sufficient).
67
United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2000).
68
Id. at 355
69
Id.
70
Id. at 357.
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withdrawals of far more than $10,000 above the amount of clean funds
available,” rejecting Davis’ contention that there was insufficient
evidence to show that the transfers in question involved more than
$10,000 in tainted funds.71
The Davis court relied heavily on the rule in Heath, a rule
developed for the interstate transfer of funds obtained by bank fraud.72
This “aggregate” rule was then applied to the case at hand, using the
government’s forensic accounting to determine that there were
aggregate withdrawals over the $10,000 limit.73 The court also took
particular care to distinguish the case from United States v. Poole,
where they had reversed a conviction based on use of commingled
funds because the check could have come from clean funds available
in the account.74 Importantly, the Fifth Circuit explicitly chose its own
precedent in the transfer of funds cases such as Heath, rather than
adopting decisions of either the Fourth Circuit in Moore, or the Ninth
Circuit in Rutgard.75
The outcomes of Moore and Davis stand in contrast with the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Rutgard.76 In Rutgard, an
ophthalmologist convicted of Medicare fraud faced a § 1957 charge
for making transfers out of an account that was funded by Medicare
payments, some of which were determined to be fraudulent.77 After
first finding that only some of the funds the government alleged were
fraudulently obtained could actually be shown to be illegal, and a
careful analysis of the accounting provided by the government, the
court found that the government could not show that the funds proven
fraudulent had been touched by the transfers which served as the basis

71

Id.
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. (citing United States v. Poole, 557 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1977)).
75
Id.
76
See id. at 355-56; United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1290 (9th Cir.
1997); United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 977 (4th Cir. 1994).
77
Rutgard, 116 F.3d at 1290.
72
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of the charges.78 After determining that only $46,000 of the money in
the commingled account could be shown to be the profit of fraud, the
court held that “so far as the evidence at trial goes, more than $46,000
remained in the account” after the transfers in question, and that the
“transfers did not necessarily transfer the $46,000 of fraudulent
proceeds.”79
One of the key components of Rutgard is the way the court
differentiated the decisions dealing with § 1956, which
overwhelmingly hold that commingling will not defeat a prosecution,
with § 1957 law.80 Section 1956, the court held in agreement with
other interpretations, is meant to catch even transfers which merely
involve ill gotten funds.81 The court pointed out that the elimination of
language which involves “the attempt to cleanse dirty money,” and the
“intent to commit a crime or the design of concealing criminal fruits,”
makes § 1957 a different, and potentially much broader law.82 The
court held that § 1957 is a powerful tool because it makes “any dealing
with a bank potentially a trap for the drug dealer or any other
defendant who has a hoard of criminal cash.”83 As such, the court
reasoned that “such a powerful instrument of criminal justice should
not be expanded by judicial invention or ingenuity.”84 The court here
pointed out that had the government charged Rutgard with the deposit
of fraudulent proceeds over $10,000, they probably would have
succeeded based on the testimony of its accounting expert.85 However,
in light of the fact that Rutgard was charged with transfer of the funds,
it could not be shown without doubt that his transfers necessarily
touched the $46,000 that the court found was fraudulently acquired.86
78

Id.
Id. at 1292.
80
See id.
81
Id. at 1291-92.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 1292.
79
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The court specifically mentioned the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
Moore, saying that “unlike § 1956, § 1957 does not cover any funds
‘involved.’”87
In examining the circuit split surrounding commingling of funds
in § 1957 cases, there are three slightly different holdings from each of
the three circuits.88 The Fourth Circuit’s test in Moore, based largely
on § 1956 precedent, seems to hold that commingling can never defeat
prosecution, particularly when the transactions involve property rather
than money.89 The Fifth Circuit in Davis relied on their own precedent
in cases dealing with fraudulent transfers, took a careful look at the
aggregate withdrawals and accounting and held that when the
aggregate withdrawals exceeded the amount of clean money, the
conviction will stand.90 Finally, in Rutgard, the Ninth Circuit took a
close look at the legislative intent behind both § 1956 and § 1957 and
determined that there are enough differences in the two statutes that
they could not adopt the § 1956 precedent dealing with commingling,
but rather placed the responsibility of accurate accounting on the
government.91
II. UNITED STATES V. HADDAD
A. The Case
The Seventh Circuit squarely addressed 18 U.S.C. § 1957 in
United States v. Haddad, a case which dealt with the foundational
crime of wire fraud and included two counts of money laundering.92
The case followed the misadventures of Anwar Haddad, who, in
January of 2000 became the owner of a small “mom and pop” store
87

Id.
See United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 977 (4th Cir. 1994); Rutgard, 116
F.3d at 1291; United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 357 (5th Cir. 1996).
89
See Moore, 27 F.3d at 977.
90
Davis, 226 F.3d at 357
91
Rutgard, 116 F.3d at 1291-92.
92
United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 2006).
88
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called the R & F Grocery (R & F).93 R & F was a part of the United
States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Food Stamp Program, a
program which distributes “food stamp benefits” to low-income
families to help them buy staple food items.94 With the advent of
modern technology, food stamp benefits no longer actually involves
the distribution of food stamps as such, but provides benefits through
an Electronic Benefit Transfer, similar to a debit card, and known as a
“LINK card” in the state of Illinois.95 As part of the Food Stamp and
LINK program, participant stores are provided with a specialized
point-of-sale machine which deducts money from the LINK card when
food is purchased.96 When the participant scans their card and enters
their unique PIN number, the machine checks the balance of the
participants account and authorizes the sale of the staple food
products.97 The store’s machine totals the food stamp sales at the end
of the day and submits them to the food stamp program, which
reimburses the store through an electronic deposit of funds that
transfers directly into the store’s designated bank account.98
Eligibility for the Food Stamp Program is premised on vendors
completing documentation and training programs which spell out the
rules of the program.99 Chief amongst the rules of the program is that
the vendor may not redeem food stamp benefits for ineligible items, or
for cash.100 Haddad, upon becoming owner of R & F, signed the
applications to continue as a food stamp-eligible vendor.101
In the summer of 2002, the Chicago Police Department (CPD)
noticed that large numbers of people were gathering outside the R & F

93

Id.
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. 786-87.
100
Id. at 787.
101
Id.
94
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Grocery around midnight on the first of the month.102 The CPD then
contacted the United States Postal Inspection Service and the USDA to
report the suspected food stamp fraud.103 The USDA compiled a list of
R & F’s food stamp redemptions and found suspicious activity.104 The
CPD followed up, and through investigation and use of a “CI” or
confidential informant, found that R & F, and in fact Haddad himself,
were exchanging food stamp benefits for cash at around 50 cents on
the dollar.105
After his arrest on August 5, 2002, Haddad admitted that he had
been trafficking in food stamps, and that he had instructed his
employees to exchange food stamps for cash.106 A financial analysis of
R & F’s bank records determined that of the $1,057,342.72 deposited
in the store’s account from April 7, 2000 through August, 2002,
$1,056,962.41 were electronic reimbursements from the Food Stamp
Program, and only $345.31 were cash deposits.107 Further analysis of
the store’s withdrawals and debits revealed that only $45,748.34 of the
money deposited in the account went to purchase Food Stamp
Program eligible inventory, while Haddad took $708,546.14 out of the
account through checks written to himself or his family or deposits to
a personal account at First Savings Bank of Hegeswich.108 Ultimately,
two of these withdrawals, in the form of checks to Haddad and his
other bank account formed the basis of the § 1957 charge.109 After
being convicted of one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1343 and two counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1957, Haddad appealed, alleging entrapment on the wire fraud
charges, insufficient evidence to convict him on the money laundering

102

Id.
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. 787-88.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 789.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 786.
103
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counts, a mistake in jury instructions, and miscalculation of loss
amount.110
Haddad’s argument regarding the money laundering counts rested
on the premise that the government did not sufficiently prove that at
least $10,000 of the checks which formed the foundation of the charge
contained “illegitimate” funds.111 The Seventh Circuit was confronted
with the fact that, in light of the information gleaned during the
investigation, Haddad had “commingled legitimate and illegitimate
business funds in the R & F business account,” though the
government’s accounting showed that 99.96% of the money deposited
in the account was from food stamp reimbursement.112
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Reasoning and Holding
The Seventh Circuit used a variety of precedent to make its
decision on commingling of funds in United States v. Haddad.113 The
court first cited its own holdings in cases dealing with § 1956.114 The
court noted that “[i]n similar cases, under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, we have
reasoned that ‘[w]e cannot believe that Congress intended that
participants in unlawful activity could prevent their own convictions
under the money laundering statute simply by commingling funds
derived from both ‘specified unlawful activities’ and other
activities.’”115 The court also reasoned that the “government need not
trace every dollar of income and connect it to a specific instance of
laundering.”116

110

Id..
Id. at 791.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 791-92.
114
Id. at 791.
115
Id. at 791-92 (citing United States v. Baker, 227 F.3d 955, 965-66 (7th Cir.
2000)).
116
Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792; see also Baker, 227 F.3d at 965-66; United States
v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 576 (7th Cir. 2000).
111
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After looking at its own reasoning regarding commingling in §
1956 cases, the court moved on to an examination of the decisions of
other circuit courts to have looked at commingling in § 1957 cases.117
First, the court examined the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Moore.118 Quoting Moore, the court noted that “‘where the
funds used in the particular transaction originated from a single source
of commingled illegally-acquired and legally-acquired funds or from
an asset purchased with such commingled funds, the government is
not required to prove that no ‘untainted’ funds were involved, or that
the funds used in the transaction were exclusively derived from the
specified unlawful activities.’”119
The Seventh Circuit then found the Fifth Circuits “similar
approach” in United States v. Davis to be instructive.120 The Seventh
Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s use of its own precedent for
commingled transfers.121 Citing Davis, the court agreed that “‘when
tainted money is mingled with untainted money in a bank account,
there is no longer any way to distinguish the tainted from the untainted
because money is fungible.’”122
While Haddad advocated use of the Ninth Circuit’s approach to
commingled funds, the Seventh Circuit found this “framework
untenable.”123 The Seventh Circuit court interpreted the Ninth
Circuit’s decision to hold that “in the case of withdrawal of funds from
a commingled account, the government could only prove that
illegitimate funds were withdrawn if all of the funds in the account are
proven to be criminally derived.”124 The court then returned to its own

117

Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792.
Id.
119
Id. (citing United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 976 (4th Cir. 1994)).
120
Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792.
121
Id.
122
Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 357 (5th Cir. 2000)).
123
Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792.
124
Id. (citing United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1997)).
118
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precedent, finding that in the “analogous area of Section 1956 cases
that the Rutgard ‘all or nothing’ approach is unworkable.”125
After interpreting the precedent available, and evaluating the three
different holdings of the other circuits, the Seventh Circuit found that
Haddad had indeed violated § 1957.126 The court found that the
“government proved aggregate withdrawals of far more than $10,000
above the amount of clean funds available.”127 Continuing, the court
noted that “the vast majority of funds transferred to the Haddad’s
business account from the food stamp reimbursements were not
supported by evidence of legitimate food sales.”128 The Seventh
Circuit then expressly adopted “the Fourth and Fifth Circuit
approaches to the Section 1957 cases and therefore find that the
evidence to convict Haddad on money laundering was sufficient.”129
III. ANALYSIS
Given that almost all of the money in Haddad’s business account
came from USDA reimbursements that he could not properly account
for, and the amount of clearly legitimate cash was negligible, the
Seventh Circuit was ultimately correct in its decision.130 While the
Seventh Circuit did arrive at the right decision, they missed an
opportunity to clarify and distinguish § 1957 jurisprudence from §
1956 cases. First, by placing too much reliance on § 1956 precedent,
the Seventh Circuit failed to account for differences in the two
statutes. Second, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning glosses over
important differences and similarities between the tests of the Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits in § 1957 cases.

125

Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792 (citing United States v. Jackson, 95 F.2d 832, 840
(7th Cir. 1991)).
126
Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 791.
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A. Over-reliance on § 1956 Precedent
To come to its decision in Haddad, the Seventh Circuit relied
heavily on both its own precedent in § 1956 money laundering cases,
and in the decisions of other courts that were influenced by § 1956
precedent.131 This heavy reliance on § 1956 fails to account for
differences between it and § 1957, a difference illustrated by a
comparison of the two statutes, and by the circumstances of the § 1956
cases in question.132
While both 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and 18 U.S.C. § 1957 deal with the
same general subject, the two statutes clearly have differences.133
Section 1956 seems to address more squarely the original intent of the
Money Laundering Act of 1986 as it was presented to Congress.134
Congress’ intent in enacting money laundering statutes was to close
loopholes in reporting law caused by narrow interpretation of
transaction reporting laws which dealt only with transactions of more
than $10,000.135 The language of § 1956 also requires that the activity
upon which the charge is based be designed to conceal the origins of
the money involved.136 Combining Congress’ goal of preventing
“structuring crimes” meant to evade reporting limits with the statutes
clearly stated requirement that the transaction be undertaken with the
intent to conceal the illegal funds strongly suggests that § 1956 should
never be defeated by commingling of funds. In fact, in the § 1956

131

Id. at 791-92; see also United States v. Baker, 227 F.3d 955, 965-66 (7th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 576 (7th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 976 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832,
840 (7th Cir. 1991).
132
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1957; see also Baker,
227 F.3d 955; Smith, 223 F.3d 554; Jackson, 935 F.2d 832.
133
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1956; 18 U.S.C. § 1957; see also Strafer, supra
note 9, at 161.
134
See SEN. REP. NO. 99-433, 1-42 (1986).
135
Strafer, supra note 9, at 159-60.
136
18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1)(B); § 1956 (a)(2)(B); see also Kaufman, et. al.,
supra note 20, at 799.
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cases dealing with commingling, the commingling can be construed to
be part of the conspiracy to conceal the illegal money.137
Section 1957 represents a potentially broader law.138 Its intent has
been perceived to be to “dissuade people from conducting even
ordinary commercial transactions with people suspected to be involved
in criminal activity.”139 There is no requirement that the accused
money launderer under § 1957 have any intent to further or conceal
the unlawful activity.140 Section 1957 instead relies on a threshold
value to determine whether or not a violation has occurred.141
The importance of the threshold limit and the differences is best
illustrated in the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the two statutes in United
States v. Rutgard.142 The Ninth Circuit court noted that five elements
differentiate § 1956 from § 1957; “its title, its requirement of intent, its
broad reference to ‘the property involved,’ its satisfaction by a
transaction that ‘in part’ accomplishes the design, and its requirement
that the intent be to commit another crime or to hide the fruits of a
crime already committed.”143 The Rutgard court noted that “the
description of the crime does not speak to the attempt to cleanse dirty
money by putting in a clean form and so disguising it,” but that “[t]he
statute applies to the most open, above-board transaction.”144 The
Ninth Circuit called § 1957 “a powerful tool . . . mak[ing] any dealing
with a bank potentially a trap for the drug dealer or any other
137

See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 227 F.3d 955, 965 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The
‘clean’ money was also ‘involved in’ the conspiracy in that . . . it helped further and
facilitate the operation”); United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1134 (5th Cir.
1997) (“because ‘clean’ money that is commingled with ‘unclean’ money facilitates
the money laundering operation, the ‘clean’ money is ‘involved’ in the offense”).
138
Strafer, supra note 9, at 161.
139
Kaufman, et. al., supra note 20, at 798 (citing H. REP. NO. 99-855,at 14
(1986)).
140
Kaufman, et. al., supra note 20, at 798.
141
18 U.S.C. § 1957 (a).
142
United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 1997).
143
Id.
144
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (broadly defining “monetary
transaction”)).
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defendant who has a hoard of criminal cash derived from specific
crimes.”145 Calling it a “draconian law, . . . powerful by its elimination
of criminal intent,” the Ninth Circuit strongly cautions that “[s]uch a
powerful instrument of criminal justice should not be expanded by
judicial invention or ingenuity.”146 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found
that they “do not find helpful in interpreting § 1957 cases the cases
applying § 1956.”147
The Seventh Circuit made a mistake when it applied its § 1956
precedent to the facts in Haddad.148 The two statutes were intended to
serve different purposes, and developed in different ways.149 By
relying too heavily on inappropriate § 1956 precedent, the Seventh
Circuit did nothing to clarify § 1957 enforcement.
B. Use of the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuit Holdings
The Seventh Circuit also based its decision in Haddad on the
holdings of the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit court decisions.150 In
interpreting these decisions, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
Fourth and Fifth Circuit courts’ tests agreed, while the Ninth Circuit
court’s test was judged inappropriate.151 This analysis failed to
properly dissect the decisions of the other circuit courts, and missed
important similarities and differences.

145

Rutgard, 116 F.3d at 1291.
Id.
147
Id.
148
United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2006).
149
See Strafer, supra note 9, at 161 (noting that the two statutes grew out of
the different houses of Congress, with § 1956 developed primarily in the Senate and
§ 1957 originating in the House of Representatives).
150
Haddad, 462 F.3d 783 at 192.
151
Id.
146

626
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/7

22

Snedigar: Loose Change: The Seventh Circuit Misses an Opportunity to Clarif

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 2

Spring 2007

1. Use of the Moore decision
The Seventh Circuit began its examination of other circuit court
law by looking at the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Moore.152 In Moore, the Fourth Circuit dealt with the issue of
commingling in the context of a real estate transaction whose
financing was premised on fraudulently acquired loans.153 The
evidence in Moore showed that the real estate involved, several
commercial condominiums, were purchased with $926,000 obtained
by bank fraud and the sale of legitimately acquired properties with an
estimated value of $100,000.154 Given that the “overwhelming bulk”
of the purchase money was acquired through fraud, and that this fraud
effectively made the condominium purchase possible, the court held
that the “jury was entitled to conclude . . . that when the
condominiums were eventually sold, the net proceeds of that sale were
in their entirety property derived from or developed out of the
proceeds of Moore’s bank fraud.”155 The court noted that, “when funds
obtained from unlawful activity have been combined with funds from
lawful activity into a single asset, the illicitly-acquired funds and the
legitimately-acquired funds (or the respective portions of the property
purchased with each) cannot be distinguished from each other.”156
In each of the other cases dealing with commingling under §
1957, the courts dealt with mixing of funds in legitimate bank
accounts rather than a monolithic transaction such as the sale of the
condominiums.157 The Fourth Circuit correctly held that commingling
in a single asset cannot defeat prosecution.158 When the transaction
152

Id.
United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 977 (4th Cir. 1994).
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 976-77.
157
See United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783, 792 (7th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 356-57 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Rutgard, 116
F.3d 1270, 1290-1291 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Moore, 27 F.3d at 976-77.
158
Moore, 27 F.3d at 977.
153
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involves withdrawals from a mixed account, however, it becomes
inappropriate to approach the transaction in the same way as a real
estate sale. Given that § 1957 requires that the transaction have a
“value greater than $10,000 . . . derived from specified unlawful
activity,” it becomes necessary for a court faced with commingled
funds in a bank account to provide a more accurate accounting of the
value of the charged transaction.159 The Seventh Circuit erred when it
relied on the Fourth Circuit’s test in Haddad.
2. Use of the Davis decision
The second of the circuit court cases examined by the Seventh
Circuit in Haddad was the Davis case out of the Fifth Circuit.160 In the
Davis case, the Fifth Circuit paid close attention to the accounting
evidence presented by the government.161 After analyzing the
accounting, the court rested its decision on the “aggregate withdrawal”
precedent of its fraudulent transfer cases such as Heath and Poole.162
The Fifth Circuit noted that using the aggregate withdrawal method is
appropriate because “[t]o view each transaction in isolation . . . would
defeat the purposes of the statute.”163 The Fifth Circuit further refined
their test by contrasting it with the test advanced in Rutgard, rejecting
the notion that the entire balance must be withdrawn.164
While the Seventh Circuit indicated that they agreed with the
Fifth Circuit’s holding, they failed to mention the aggregate
withdrawal aspect of that court’s holding.165 By failing to
acknowledge this aspect of the decision, particularly the Davis court’s
159

18 U.S.C. § 1957 (a) (2006); see, e.g., Rutgard , 116 F.3d at 1291; Davis,
226 F.3d at 357.
160
Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792.
161
Davis, 226 F.3d at 356, 357.
162
Id. at 357; see also United States v. Heath, 970 F.2d 1397, 1404 (5th Cir.
1992); United States v. Poole, 557 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1977).
163
Heath, 970 F.3d at 357.
164
Id. (citing Rutgard, 116 F.3d at 1292).
165
Haddad, 462, F.3d at 792.
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mention of the Poole decision, the Seventh Circuit missed the weight
the Fifth Circuit placed on accounting.166
3. Rejection of the Rutgard decision
The final case that the Seventh Circuit used to decide Haddad was
United States v. Rutgard.167 Rutgard is important for two reasons.
First, the court in Rutgard advanced a reasonable argument that
commingling in § 1956 and § 1957 should not be compared.168
Second, with the exception of the finding that “all the funds” in the
questionable account must have been withdrawn to uphold Rutgard’s
conviction, the Ninth Circuit’s general rule, and their heavy reliance
on accounting evidence are analogous to the Fifth Circuit’s “aggregate
withdrawal” test.169
The Seventh Circuit made no mention of the Ninth Circuit’s
argument that § 1956 and § 1957 precedent should be kept separate.170
In fact, the Seventh Circuit made a point of comparing its own § 1956
precedent with the Rutgard holding.171 The Seventh Circuit also failed
to note the similarities between the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Davis
and the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Rutgard.172 While the Seventh
Circuit’s rejection of the “all of nothing” aspect of Rutgard was
correct, it missed an opportunity to extract and amplify the aspects of
the Ninth Circuit’s test that coincide with the Fifth Circuit’s test, and
to advance the Ninth Circuit’s holding regarding the differences
between commingling in § 1956 and § 1957 law.173

166

Id.
Id.
168
Rutgard, 116 F.3d at 1290-92.
169
Id. at 1292; see also United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 356-57 (5th Cir.
2000).
170
Haddad, 462 F.3d at 792.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
167
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IV. SECTION 1957 AFTER HADDAD
The Seventh Circuit missed an opportunity in deciding Haddad.
With the evidence at hand, it was clear that Haddad had in fact
violated § 1957 by writing checks in amounts greater than $10,000 on
an account that could be shown to be almost entirely funded with the
profits of food stamp fraud.174 In deciding this case as they did, the
Seventh Circuit has left the door open to a potential broadening of the
law. In § 1956 cases commingling of funds is often intentional, and
serves to meet the requirement that the transaction be conducted “with
the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity.”175
Section 1957, however, contains no “intent to promote” element,
relying on the value of the transaction.176 As such, while no amount of
commingling should foil a § 1956 prosecution, a § 1957 prosecution
should only rest on solid accounting that shows the value of the
transaction was indeed “of a value greater than $10,000 . . . derived
from specified unlawful activity.”177
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit could have reconciled the tests of
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.178 The Seventh Circuit should have
recognized the differences between § 1956 and § 1957 that make it
difficult to apply the § 1956 precedent.179
By stressing only the value of the transaction, and using § 1956
law as comparison, the Seventh Circuit left open ended the question of
whether, or what amount, of commingling of funds will or will not foil
a prosecution under § 1957. While Haddad had obviously violated the
law, the question of whether all transfers from a commingled account
invokes § 1957 remains open. The Seventh Circuit has provided no
174

Id. at 791.
18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
176
18 U.S.C. § 1957.
177
18 U.S.C. § 1957 (a).
178
See United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 357 (5th Cir.2000); United States
v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 1997).
179
See 18 U.S.C. § 1956; 18 U.S.C. § 1957; Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1291-92;
see also Strafer, supra note 9, at 160; Kaufman, et. al., supra note 20, at 796, 798.:
Boran, supra note 8, at 851-53.
175
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guidance on what to do when the amount of legal and illegal funding
is equal, or if the balance tips toward legal funds. Without a better test,
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1957 will remain unsettled law.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit missed an opportunity to amalgamate and
solidify the various court’s disparate rulings regarding the
commingling of funds in § 1957 cases. Had the court reconciled the
similar tests of the Fifth Circuit in Davis and the Ninth Circuit in
Rutgard, rejected Rutgard’s all-or-nothing approach, and recognized
the fundamental differences between § 1956 and § 1957, it could have
articulated a test that would clarify the law.
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